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Abstract
Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in
gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function
form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines
fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now
the norm in the EU, obliges the owner of a pipeline to transport gas
for others, provided they pay a regulated transport fee. From a game
theoretic perspective, this institutional setting creates so called "ex-
ternalities," the description of which requires partition function form
(PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to compute payoffs,
reflecting the power structure, for a pipeline system with regulated
TPA. The method is based on an iterative flow mechanism to deter-
mine gas flows and transport fees for individual players and uses the
recursive core and the minimal claim function to convert the PPF game
back into a CFF game, which can be solved by standard methods. We
illustrate the approach with a simple stylized numerical example of
the gas network in Central Eastern Europe with a focus on Ukraine’s
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1 Introduction
Markets for natural gas depend on long-lived and idiosyncratic, hence, sunk,
investments in technical infrastructure. In particular, pipelines create large
quasi rents, and the power to appropriate these rents has attracted substan-
tial academic interest. The literature has pursued two different approaches
using tools from non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, respectively.
The non-cooperative approach starts with a description of how players
interact: their strategy spaces. After solving for the Nash-equilibrium strate-
gies, the individual payoffs and the overall welfare are calculated. The former
reveal the market power of a player, often measured as a mark-up on marginal
cost, and the latter indicates the efficiency of cooperation. The literature has
developed disaggregated models with a large number of players.1 However,
in order to keep the analysis manageable, highly restrictive assumptions on
the strategy space of the players (usually linear prices or quantities) and on
the sequencing of moves, hence, the ability to commit, have been adopted.
These assumptions are clearly at odds with the complexity of negotiations
and the widespread use of comprehensive price-quantity contracts, which we
observe in the European gas markets.2 Moreover, the results on market power
and the alleged inefficiency of the market are largely driven exactly by these
counter-factual assumptions (see Hubert and Orlova (2018)).
The cooperative approach, in contrast, rests on the assumption that ratio-
nal players are able to coordinate their activities efficiently. Gas producers,
1For multilevel oligopoly models of the European/Eurasian network, see, among others,
De Wolf and Smeers (1997), Gürkan et al. (1999) Boots et al. (2004), and Abada et al.
(2013). Breton and Zaccour (2001) compare the Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria in
this market. On the North American natural gas system, Gabriel et al. (2004, 2005b,a)
provides a series of papers among which they use computational and (Nash-Cournot)
equilibrium methods.
2These contracts stipulate the total quantity of gas produced and/or shipped and the
total payment. The quantity can be set to ensure efficiency, and the payment determines
how the surplus is shared. Such contracts, also referred to as ’take-or-pay contracts’ in
the gas industry, can avoid the inefficiencies of double marginalization along the vertical
supply chain: production/transport/consumption (see Energy Charter Secretariat (2007)
for more details).
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pipeline owners, and gas consumers will trade the efficient amounts of gas,
but the payments to producers and pipeline owners, hence, the sharing of
economic surplus between the participants, will reflect the players’ power in
the network. Intuitively, the power of a player will reflect his control of im-
portant infrastructure, such as gas fields or pipelines or facilities (e.g. power
plants), and on the difficulty of replacing his role in a given network. The
primitive of cooperative game theory is the description of the gains from co-
operation. It is obtained as follows: take an arbitrary (sub)group of players,
usually referred to as coalition, and calculate how much surplus they can
generate for themselves if they use the means at their disposal in the best
possible way. The result of this optimization problem is called the value of
the coalition. For a gas network, it requires the following: first, finding the
subnetwork (gas producing fields, pipelines, and gas consuming appliances)
that the coalition has access to, and second, determining the optimal usage
of the subnetwork and the resulting surplus.3 By repeating this thought ex-
periment for all possible coalitions we obtain a complete description of the
gains from cooperation in the given environment, the so-called value function.
Finally, the game is solved by determining how the players share the gains
resulting from cooperation by assigning a payoff to every player. A player’s
share in the total surplus can be interpreted as his power index. There is no
consensus in cooperative game theory on which theoretical solution is best;
the applied literature has explored the Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953) as well
as the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
A number of studies have used the cooperative approach to study how
pipeline investments and access rights affect the power relation in the Eu-
ropean/Eurasian gas network. The literature explores different venues for
the treatment of investments and access rights and assumes that the players,
usually interpreted as countries or the dominant firm in a region, can make
efficient use of the existing infrastructure. Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011)
study how options to invest in new pipelines or upgrading existing ones af-
fect the power structure between Russia and major transit countries towards
North-Western Europe. Hubert and Suleymanova (2008) consider the same
geographical region and ask whether dynamic strategies in repeated games
can support efficient investment. Hubert and Cobanli (2015) and Cobanli
(2014) extend the geographical scope to all of Europe and Central Asia, re-
spectively, and study how various strategic pipeline projects affect the power
relation between major gas exporters, the transit countries, and the Euro-
pean regions importing gas. Finally, Hubert and Orlova (2018) ask how the
3When setting up this optimization problem one can also account for limits in the
ability to coordinate (Roson and Hubert (2015)).
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liberalization of pipeline access within Europe affects the distribution of rents
between European consumers, local incumbents, and external gas producers.
However, the method used in this literature to determine the value func-
tion is applicable only if all pipelines are characterized by exclusive ownership
rights. With exclusive ownership, no party has access to a pipeline without
the voluntary consent of the owner who is free to negotiate a compensation
for his service.4 In the model only coalitions that include the owner of a
pipeline can use it. When calculating the value of such a coalition, we can,
therefore, ignore what the players outside of the coalition do. In the language
of game theory, such a setting is called “free from externalities” and can be
represented by the so called characteristic function form (CFF), assigning
one real number to each possible coalition of players.
Exclusive ownership is not the only relevant institutional setting. For
example, many pipelines within the European Union are subject to regulated
third party access (TPA). Since the early 1990s, the European Commission
and the European Council have adopted a number of increasingly assertive
directives and regulations to develop the common market for gas by ensuring
fair TPA access to the transportation system within the Union — see EU
(1991, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2009). While much of the details of access regulation
have been left to the member countries, some have established a system of
transport fees overseen by a regulatory authority. Under such a regime, the
owner of a pipeline no longer enjoys exclusive ownership. Instead, he has to
grant access, provided he is compensated according to the regulated tariff.
TPA has the potential to create externalities between coalitions in two ways:
Resource allocation. Suppose that the owner of a TPA-regulated pipeline
is a member of a particular coalition that wants to make use of the
pipeline. Under TPA, outsiders may also be entitled to use this pipeline.
If the capacity of the pipeline cannot accommodate all requests, then
the availability for the coalition under consideration, hence, the coali-
tion’s value, depends on the pattern of cooperation among outside play-
ers and the rules for solving conflicting claims under TPA.
Rent transfer. Since all coalitions maximize the economic surplus, the eco-
nomic costs of producing and transporting gas (e.g. cost of pressurizing,
maintenance, etc.) are accounted for. Regulated transport fees, how-
ever, may stipulate a compensation above and beyond economic cost,
for example, in order to allow the pipeline owner to recover sunk invest-
ment cost. With such a (quasi) rent transfer, the value of a coalition
4Different sections of a pipeline connecting two nodes can be owned by different players
(e.g. when pipelines cross several countries). Obviously, all players owning a section have
to grant access for the gas transport.
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again depends on whether outsiders want to use resources owned by its
members.5
In the presence of externalities that naturally arise with TPA pipelines, the
surplus of a coalition depends not only on its members, but also on the
patterns of cooperation between the outside players, the so-called coalition
structure or partition of players. As a result, the gains from cooperation have
to be described in partition function form (PFF) Thrall and Lucas (1963).
Unfortunately, there exists neither a commonly agreed method to calculate
this PFF nor to solve PFF games in general.
In this paper we use a simple example to propose a method applicable for
gas networks. The iterative flow mechanism traces gas flows and transport
fees for the computation of the PFF. In a second step we derive the minimal
claim function based on the recursive core to obtain the corresponding CFF
game. Finally, the game is solved with the Shapley Value as a measure of
bargaining power. Using a simple linear framework, we show that the explicit
consideration of transport fees and transport profits may significantly affect
the results.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2.1 we summarize the
model principles. In section 2.3 we show how the defined framework can be
used for characteristic function form games. Section 2.4 describes the main
contribution, namely, we show how the defined framework can be used for
partition function form games. Section 3 demonstrates the potential of the
proposed approach on a simple example. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Model
In this section we describe the principles of the model which is a generalisa-
tion of the setup introduced by Sziklai et al. (2018). First, we introduce the
key assumptions, then, we summarize the model parameters, and finally, we
describe the details of calculation.
5Hubert and Cobanli (2015) and Hubert and Orlova (2018) consider TPA for pipelines
within EU, but they ignore possible capacity conflicts and assume that access fees only
cover the cost of the transport of natural gas so that no player would receive a transport
profit. Such a regulation would induce efficient pipeline usage and is certainly an interest-
ing benchmark, but it is also a kind of worst-case scenario for the owners of the pipelines
and politically not very likely.
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2.1 General Approach
We consider a gas network with l nodes andm pipelines connecting the nodes.
Sources of natural gas (the sites of gas production) and gas consumers may
be located at different nodes. We assume n players, which we associate with
nodes, though, any player may hold multiple nodes (n ≤ l). In line with
most of the literature mentioned in the introduction, one might consider the
players to be countries or regions and pipelines to be long distance trunk
lines. We distinguish between exclusive pipelines and TPA pipelines. A
coalition may use an exclusive pipeline only if the players associated with
both nodes are members of the coalition. A TPA pipeline can be used by all
players, provided they pay a regulated transport fee to its owners.
We assume inelastic demand: A fixed level of gas consumption is given
in the different nodes. Any node with nonzero consumption has access to an
alternative local "backstop technology" describing the cost of substituting
natural gas usage. These option may represent access to LNG, alternative
fuels, or even the cost of curtailing gas consumption. Regarding these alter-
native sources, we assume that they cannot be traded. We assume constant
unit cost for gas production, backstop technologies, and gas transport. The
unit cost may differ for the various nodes and pipelines. We also assume
regulated transport fees per unit to be constant and not lower than the
transport cost on the respective pipeline. We refer to the difference between
the regulated fee and the transportation cost as transport profit. With these
assumptions, the optimal flow problem turns into a linear cost minimization
problem.
The proposed model tracks the transport fee payments on the level of
individual flows. In other words, in our model we do not only describe
the ’flows of a coalition,’ but we distinguish between flows corresponding to
different players in the coalition. This implies that for a given coalition, we
have to determine the flows of the members one by one.
On the one hand, this will be required since we assume that the transfer
fees are paid for nominal transfers, not for net transfers. The following simple
example shows that, in this case, it is necessary to keep track of the individual
flows. Let us assume a chain of pipelines as A−B−C−D−E, where B and
D are sources, and furthermore, the middle of the pipeline, which belongs to
C, is TPA. If in the coalition {A,B,D,E} A buys from D and E buys from
B, then the nominal flows through C will be higher than the net flow since
the flows D → A and B → E are counter-directed in contrast to the scenario
where A buys fromB and E buys fromD. On the other hand, this way we are
able to track the payments also on the level of players, not only on the level
of coalitions, which may be useful in the analysis and contextualization of the
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results. For this, however, we need a rule for the sequential determination of
the flows of the players inside a coalition.
We follow Sziklai et al. (2018) in using an iterative flow allocation algo-
rithm to address this problem. First, the flows of the player with the largest
demand are optimized (more precisely, the node with the largest demand
belonging to the player with the largest demand since multiple nodes are
possible), then, the second, and so on. This potentially means that players
with the smallest demand sometimes have to use more expensive sources and
routes. We conjecture that gas providers tend to prioritize large customers
over small costumers, so this simplifying assumption is acceptable to keep
the model complexity at an intermediate level. Note that if the optimization
is performed in one step, then the individual flows may not be identified,
hence the iterative approach. Let us note here that players in a coalition pay
transport fees to each other for using pipelines. This way transport profits
also arise inside a coalition. However, these transfers within a coalition net
out when calculating the coalition value.
2.2 Formal Set-Up
In the following we use the lower index i for the indexing of players, the
index j for indexing nodes, and the index k for indexing edges (pipelines).
The pipeline network structure is described by a directed graph and its in-
duced node-branch incidence matrix A. A ∈ Rl×m, where l is the number
of nodes and m is the number of edges. Unlike Roson and Hubert (2015) or
Sziklai et al. (2018), where players are strictly corresponding to nodes, we do
not assume bijective node-player mapping. The matrix Λ ∈ Rl×n defines the
node-player relations. Λ(j, i) = 1 if and only if the node j belongs to player
i. As each node may belong to only one player, the sum of each rows in Λ is
1.
2.2.1 Edge properties
We denote the transport capacity of edge k by q¯k. q¯ ∈ Rm is the vector of
transport capacities. Transport capacities limit the maximal flow values on
edges. The matrix T ∈ Rn×m represents the transport costs. T (i, k) denotes
the cost imposed on player i by the transport of one unit of gas on pipeline
k. Similarly to the transport costs, F ∈ Rn×m defines the transport fees.
F (i, k) is the fee that player i is entitled to receive from other players for
the transport of one unit of gas on pipeline k. In the following examples it
is assumed that the owner(s) of the pipeline is (are) determined by the two
endpoint nodes of the pipeline. We assume that T (i, k) ≤ F (i, k) ∀(i, k).
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In the special case when T (i, k) = F (i, k), line k does not yield a profit for
player i. The structure of T and F (e.g. the position of nonzero elements in
the matrices) reflects the topographical position of pipelines and players.
2.2.2 Node properties
Nodal consumption is denoted by the vector d ∈ Rl. We assume p different
sources for gas and define the matrix S ∈ Rl×p, which maps the sources to
the nodes. Hence, S(j, r) defines the (nonzero) unit cost of gas production
from the rth source, found in node j. L¯ ∈ Rp defines the maximal production
capacity of the different sources.
2.3 Determining the flows and the value of a coalition
In this section we determine the value of a coalition in itself (not embedded in
any partition), serving as the basis for a characteristic function form (CFF)
cooperative game. Let N denote the set of players corresponding to the n
individual players. Subsets of N are called coalitions, and when treated as a
coalition, N is called the grand coalition.
As previously discussed in 2.1, for any coalition the players’ flows are
determined in an iterative way, progressing from the player with the highest
total consumption to other players. The process of the iterative calculation
is depicted in Fig. 1.
As a first step we determine which resources are accessible. This step
effectively defines a sub-network. Any player in any coalition may use only
gas production of nodes that belong to players in the coalition. Any coali-
tion may use those pipelines whose both endpoints belong to players in the
coalition. In addition, it may use all pipelines under TPA regulation. In
the latter case the corresponding transfer fees have to be paid for all corre-
sponding players (whose row holds a nonzero element in the matrix F in the
column of the pipeline).
2.3.1 Determination of flows for the ith member of a coalition
The transfer capacities and gas sources available for the ith member of the
coalition are determined by available pipelines, total transfer capacities, and
the flows of the previous members of the coalition. Under these constraints,
the ith player satisfies his consumption, minimizing the sum of the production
cost, own transport costs, transfer fees paid to other players, and (possibly)
the cost of using backstop technology. In the following we will formalize the
above elements.
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Determination of the set of pipelines
available for the coalition. Determination
of constraints based on the maximal flow
capacity of these pipelines.
i = 1
Determination of flows for the
ith member of a coalition via
optimization.
Was i the last
member of the
coalition?
End
Start
Yes
No
Modification of constraints,
taking the
calculated flows into account.
Determination of payments
inside and outside the
coalition based on the
calculated flows.
i = i+1
Figure 1: The flow chart of the calculation of gas flows for a given coalition.
We assume that the members of the coalition are sorted in decreasing order
with respect to their demands. In particular, the first member of the coalition
has the maximal total demand of gas among the members.
Variables and Constraints Under the above considerations and assum-
ing a given coalition, every player of the coalition must solve a linear pro-
gramming (LP) problem to determine its flows in the network and minimize
its costs.
Variables of the LP optimization problem are as follows: let f+k (k ∈
{1, ..., m}) denote the flow in the positive direction on the kth edge. Let
f+ ∈ Rm be the vector of these flows and similarly f− ∈ Rm be the vector
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of flows opposite to the edge directions. L ∈ Rp denotes the gas production
at the different sources, which is constrained by the respective production
capacities.
L ≤ L¯ (1)
Equality type constraints Equality constraints may be classified into two
categories: fulfillment of coalitional consumption and constraints originating
from the exclusion of non-member sources.
The fulfillment of coalitional consumption is formally defined as follows.
Let us define the matrix S>0 with the same size as S, holding ones on the
positions where S(i, j) > 0. Let dC(i) be a column vector of the same size as
d but holding nonzero values only at the positions that correspond to node(s)
of the ith member of the coalition. At these positions the value of dC(i) is
the same as the value of d. In this case, the equation
[A −A S>0]

 f
+
f−
L

 = dC(i) (2)
represents the nodal conservation equations and the fulfillment of the de-
mands corresponding to the ith member of the coalition (C(i)).
Exclusion of non-member sources means that in the case of the ith player,
further equality type constraints describe that only those sources may have
nonzero inlets that are assigned to nodes corresponding to coalition member
players. These can be easily determined by Λ as follows. Let ΛC denote the
node-player matrix for the actual coalition, in the sense that every columns
in ΛC corresponding to non-member players are zero vectors. Let us denote
the column sum (as a row vector) of any matrix M by
∑
M . In this case,
the constraint
(
1−
∑
ΛTC
)
S L = 0, (3)
where the operation
(
1−
∑
ΛTC
)
is performed element-wise and describes
that non-coalitional production is zero.
Inequality type constraints First, we have non-negativity constraints:

 f
+
f−
L

 ≥ 0. (4)
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Then, we have inequalities describing the limited transport capacity of
pipelines and production limits.
(
I2m×2m 02m×p
0p×2m Ip×p
) f
+
f−
L

 ≤
(
q¯mod
L¯mod
)
, (5)
where q¯mod is a column vector of length 2m, which is derived from the original
q¯ vector and from the already determined flows, corresponding to previous
players. Similarly, L¯mod is a vector of length p, in which the gas production
for previous players are subtracted from the production capacity, and I is
the identity matrix. In the first step in the case of the first player,
q¯mod =
(
q¯
q¯
)
L¯mod = L¯.
The objective function Let us denote the ith row of matrix M by Mi,
and the ith column of matrix M by M
,i. Let us furthermore define the
matrix F i0 for the ith player as a matrix identical to F aside from the ith
row, which is zero. The construction of F i0 refers to the consideration that no
player pays transport fees to itself. With the above notations the objective
function of the actual player can be formulated as
min
f+,f−,L
[Ti,. +
∑
F i0 Ti,. +
∑
F i0
∑
S]

 f
+
f−
L

 (6)
considering the constraints detailed above. We denote the cost of player
i—the minimum of the optimization problem—by ϕ(C(i)). This way the cost
of any player is the sum of the transport cost from using its own pipelines,
the transport fees paid to other players for using his pipelines (which is at
least equal to the operational costs of the pipelines), and the cost of gas
production.
The total cost of the coalition C is defined as
ϕ(C) =
∑
i∈C
ϕ(C(i)) . (7)
2.3.2 Value of a coalition
The value of any non-singleton coalition C (in itself, not embedded in any
partition) is defined as the surplus induced by the cooperation, using the
11
sum of singleton costs as reference:
v(C) =
∑
i∈C
ϕ(Ci)− ϕ(C) + pi
i(C), (8)
where Ci is the singleton coalition containing only player i. pii(C) denotes
the total internal transport profit of coalition C, the difference of the total
amount of transport fees the players of the coalition get from each other and
the total amount of transport costs the players of the coalition imply to each
other. In other words, the intra-coalition transport profits are internalized by
a coalition. Since the above calculation can be carried out for every coalition,
the characteristic function of the game is well defined.
Let us note that the sequence of the iterative procedure depicted in Fig. 1
does not affect the resulting value of a coalition. If the demands of the players
are considered in a different order, it is possible that the flows corresponding
to individual players will be different but the final picture will be the same
(the most economical for the coalition). In other words, players evaluated
first take the less expensive routes and sources and players evaluated in the
following may take only the more expensive routes and alternatives. However,
as we will see later in the case of the PFF approach described in subsection
2.4, in the case of partitions, where multiple coalitions are active at the same
time, the evaluation sequence of the iterative algorithm may affect the results.
In the following we demonstrate the introduced concepts on a simple
example.
2.3.3 Example 1: Transfer Profits in the Absence of TPA
Let us consider the network depicted in Fig. 2.
The letters in circles indicate the players (countries). Nodes with arcs
leaving the node have a nonzero consumption, denoted by numbers at the end
of such arcs in parentheses6. Gas production is indicated with arcs entering
the node in question. The sources are numbered. After each source index, the
production capacity (maximum inlet) and the cost of production is indicated
in square brackets. In this example only source 1 corresponding to node A
is considered a ’real’ source; the others correspond to backstop technologies.
The q¯i values indicate the maximal transport capacity of pipelines.
We have to define the matrices discussed in Section 2.1. These matrices
can be be found in Appendix A. In the same Appendix in equations (18) and
6Although the proposed approach is capable of handling cases where one player has
multiple nodes, in this example we have a bijective node-player mapping to keep the calcu-
lations as simple as possible, while demonstrating the externalities arising from transport
profits.
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AC
B
1
2
3
(2)
3:[2,10]
(10)
q2=10
q3=12
q1=10
1:[15,1]
2:[10,10]
Figure 2: Network 1.
(19), the reader can find matrices T and F describing the transport costs
and fees.
The reference costs for the players (the cost of singleton coalitions) are
as follows:
ϕ({A}) = 0 ϕ({B}) = 100 ϕ({C}) = 20. (9)
These reference costs correspond to the scenarios when no gas transport takes
place, and players B and C cover their demand from their own (expensive)
backstop technology.
First, we use this example to illustrate that transport fees being larger
than transport costs (positive transport profits) do not matter in the absence
of TPA because they net out at the coalition level. Let us consider coalition
{A,B} as an example. Player B imports 10 units of gas from player A on
the direct link (edge 1). Using the T and F matrices in Appendix A, we
see that in this case the total expense of transfer is 80 (40 own cost and 40
paid as transfer fee to player A). As we can see in the first columns of the
matrices F and T , neither player A nor B gets any transfer profit from this
transfer, since the corresponding elements are equal in the two matrices. As
the source cost is 10, this means 10 units of savings compared to the reference
cost of 100.
13
In other words, equation 8 becomes
v({A,B}) = ϕ({A}) + ϕ({B})− ϕ({A,B}) + pii(C)
= 0 + 100− 90 + 0 = 10. (10)
Now we introduce positive transport profits by raising the fee above cost.
Formally, we change the matrix F to F ′ as
F ′ =

 5 0 0.74 0.5 0
0 1 1

 . (11)
The cost of coalition {A,B} would change, as in this case player B pays 50
units to player A for the transport of 10 units. But in this case, a transport
profit of 10 units is also generated, since as described by the matrix T , the
transport implies still only a cost of 40 units to player A. As player A is in
the coalition, both effects net out and equation 8 becomes
v({A,B}) = ϕ({A}) + ϕ({B})− ϕ({A,B}) + pii(C)
= 0 + 100− 100 + 10 = 10, (12)
giving the coalition with the same payoff. Transport profits can play a role
only in the case of some pipelines being subject to TPA regulation.
2.4 Determining the flows and the values of a partition
In this subsection we extend the analysis to situations in which TPA reg-
ulation creates externalities, giving rise to a partition function form (PFF)
game.
A partition of S ⊆ N is a set of mutually disjoint nonempty coalitions
whose union is S (N is the player set). Let Π(S) denote the set of partitions
of S ⊆ N . An embedded coalition is a pair (C,P), where C ∈ P ∈ Π(N).
The set of embedded coalitions is denoted by E . A game in partition function
form (Thrall and Lucas (1963)) is a pair (K, V ), where V : E → R is the
partition function, which assigns a real payoff to each embedded coalition.
This enables us to describe the positive externalites of transport profits
formally. For example, according to the approach detailed in the previous
subsection, if player X is not cooperating with anyone and no TPA pipelines
are present, then basically its value is 0. Embedded in a partition, however,
where Y and Z are cooperating and using pipelines crossing the territory of
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X (thus TPA is present), X may profit from the transport depending on the
respective values of T and F .
Our iterative approach is analogous to the case of simple coalitions. First,
we identify the coalition with the greatest total demand in the partition and
calculate its flows and value, as in section 2.3. However, in this case, we
calculate the externalities implied by the coalition and update the value of
outside coalitions (which may be singletons) as well. Then, we calculate the
flows of the next coalition, taking the flows determined in the first step into
account. After the calculation for each coalition, we update the values of
every coalition value. The externality implied by coalition C1 to coalition C2
is the sum of the externalities C1 implies to the members of C2.
We have to note that in special cases when multiple coalitions with differ-
ent gas sources are active at the the same time and the transport capacity of
the commonly used pipelines is limited, it may be important which coalition
we evaluate first (the one with the highest total demand or another). This
phenomena is demonstrated with an example in Appendix B.
Externalities of any coalition C to others may be easily determined based
on the following 2 matrices:
• QP(i, j) is the transport cost imposed by player j on player i, assuming
the partition P. The jth column of QP is determined as
QP(., j) = [T T 0n×p]xj j ∈ C , (13)
where xj is the solution of the optimization problem of player j in the
case of the given partition, composed of f+, f− and L corresponding
to the actual player.
• RP(i, j) is the transport fee paid by player j to player i, assuming the
partition P. The jth column of RP is determined as
RP(., j) = [F
j0 F j0 0n×p]xj j ∈ C . (14)
If we take the difference of the two matrices above and calculate the row
sums for rows corresponding to players outside of C, we get the externalities
implied by C at the player level. The externalities caused to any coalition
C ′ may be derived by summing up the externalities of the players in C ′.
2.4.1 Value of a coalition embedded in a partition
The value of any non-singleton coalition C embedded in partition P, denoted
by vP(C), is defined as the surplus achieved by the cooperation, using the
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sum of singleton costs as reference (see equation (15)) and the externalities
implied to it by the transport of other coalitions:
vP(C) =
∑
i∈C
ϕS(Ci)− ϕP(C) + pi(C), (15)
where Ci is still the singleton coalition containing only player i. ϕS(Ci) is
the cost of the singleton coalition Ci embedded into the partition S, which
is the partition holding only singleton coalitions. ϕP(C) denotes the cost of
coalition C embedded in partition P. Appendix B gives a simple example
of TPA-induced resource allocation and shows how the cost of a coalition
embedded in a partition may be affected by the partition.
Furthermore, in the case when the coalition is embedded in a partition,
pi in equation (15) differs from pii in equation (8), as it describes not only
internal transport profits, but also transport profits received from other coali-
tions. Formally, pi = pii + pie, where the new term pie is the transport profit
originating from external transports.
To show a simple example calculation of how externalities are generated,
we turn to example 1 again, depicted in Fig. 2. Let us consider the partition
P1 = {{A,B}, {C}} and TPA regulation for lines 2 and 3.
With the lines between nodes B-C and A-C now being accessible, the
transport of coalition {A,B} takes place via player C since this is the more
economic alternative. In this case, the matrices QP1 and RP1 will be as
follows:
QP1 =

 0 7 00 5 0
0 8 0

 RP1 =

 0 7 00 0 0
0 20 0

 . (16)
In this cooperation structure, only player B has transports, which is why
the second columns of the matrices QP1 and RP1 are nonzero. Now, as
described before, to calculate the externality from coalition {A,B} to {C},
we take the third row (corresponding to player C) of the matrix RP1 −QP1 ,
which is equal to 12. In other words, B pays a transport fee of 20 units
to player C, from which 5+3=8 units is the transport cost, and thus, it
generates a transport profit of 12.
Since the above calculation can be carried out for every coalition embed-
ded in any partition, the partition function of the game is well defined.
2.5 Analysis of PFF games
The PFF game obtained by the procedure described in the previous sub-
sections describes the gains from cooperation when regulated TPA creates
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externalities. There are two approaches to complete the analysis by deriv-
ing a power index for the different players. First, one might straightforward
solve the PFF game as such. While some solutions for PFF games have been
proposed, e.g. the extended Shapley-value, these are much more complex
(see McQuillin (2009)) than for a CFF game. Hence, as a second option,
one might use additional considerations to select a unique partition for every
possible coalition and take its value under this particular partition to be the
value for the CFF game.
Here we use the concept of theminimal claim function defined by Habis and Csercsik
(2014) to derive the characteristic function. The basic concept of the minimal
claim function is that each coalition’s minimal claim is equal to the value the
coalition gets when the rest of the players form a partition that is stable in
the spirit of the recursive core (Kóczy, 2007) 7. An example demonstrating
the calculation of the minimal claim function is described in Appendix C.
We denote the minimal claim function by vMC .
As alternatives for the recursive core, the optimistic core stability concept
of Shenoy (1979), the Gamma-core of Chander (2007), and the pessimistic
α-core of Aumann and Peleg (1960) may be used as well. While in the former
setup a coalition deviates if it has any chance of higher payoff, in the latter a
coalition deviates only if it gets a higher payoff irrespective of the cooperation
structure of the other players. For a comparative discussion of the different
approaches, see Kóczy (2018).
2.6 Shapley value
Finally, we have to decide how to solve the CFF game obtained by apply-
ing the minimal claim function to the underlying PFF game. Arguably, the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is the best-known single-value solution con-
cept in cooperative game theory (Roth (1988)). Its popularity comes partly
from the fact that there is an explicit formula to compute it, partly from its
very convincing axiomatic characterizations. Young (1985) shows that the
Shapley value is the only solution which satisfies Pareto-optimality, Symme-
try, and Strong monotonicity. This latter axiom entails that if a player’s
marginal contributions in one game are consistently as large as the same
marginal contributions in another game on the same player set, then the
player’s payoff in the first game should be at least as large as in the second
game. In other words, the Shapley value rewards productivity. This property
makes the Shapley value an excellent candidate for a power measure.
7More precisely, when more stable partitions exist for the residual game, the one im-
plying the least payoff for the coalition in question will derive the minimal claim value of
the coalition. In other words, the pessimistic recursive core is used.
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In contrast, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), another popular coopera-
tive solution concept, received less attention as a power measure. The nu-
cleolus is obtained via a lexicographic optimization, during which the profits
of the poorest coalitions are improved until a unique solution is obtained. In
this sense, the nucleolus implements some kind of social justice, which has
little to do with the bargaining positions of the players. Although Montero
(2005) argues that the nucleolus may outperform the Shapley value as a
power index for simple voting games, some empirical evidence shows that
concerning gas markets the Shapley value has the better explanatory power.
Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011) argue that terms of contracts between Rus-
sia and the transit countries Ukraine and Belarus around 2002-2003 can be
explained using the Shapley value but are at odds with predictions by the
nucleolus and the core8. In their analysis of three major pipeline projects,
Hubert and Cobanli (2015) can explain the successes and the failures, as-
suming that the players use the Shapley value to assess their power in the
network, while the nucleolus yields predictions which contradict observable
investment behavior.
3 Results and discussion
In this section we first complete all steps of the analysis for the simple net-
work described in 2.3.3. In doing so we demonstrate that explicitly consid-
ering transport profits as externalities may give significantly different results
compared to conventional approaches of cooperative game theory. Second,
we compare the different results for a more complex and more realistic ex-
ample describing the transport of natural gas from Russia to Central Europe
via Ukraine.
3.1 Example 1
In the following we compare the traditional CFF approach (see e.g. Hubert and Ikonnikova
(2011), Hubert and Suleymanova (2008), Hubert and Orlova (2018), Hubert and Cobanli
(2015), Cobanli (2014), Roson and Hubert (2015)) and the PFF approach
proposed in this article with and without TPA. In the case of the PFF ap-
proach, after the calculation of the partition function we derive the recursive-
core-based minimal claim function, with which we calculate the Shapley value
8The core is a set valued solution concept which contains the stable allocations. The
nucleolus is always a core member whenever the core is non-empty, however, the Shapley
value may lie outside the core.
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and compare this with the Shapley value derived from the simple CFF ap-
proach. We use the 3-node network introduced in subsection 2.3.3.
3.1.1 No third party access (TPA)
The value of {A,B} is discussed in subsection 2.3.3. The value of coalition
{A,C} may be derived similarly. In the case of the grand coalition, all
transports take place via the route through player C. In this case, player
B pays 10+10 units of transport fee to player C for using lines 2 and 3,
respectively, implying a transport profit of 5+7=12 to player C. Further costs
for player A include the 7 units of transport fee paid to player A, the transport
cost of 5 corresponding to line 2, and the 10 units of gas production cost. This
means a saving of 58 units for player B. Player C pays 1.4 units of transport
fee to player A along with 0.6 transport cost and 2 units of production cost,
resulting in a saving of 16. As in this case the transport profit of player C is
internalized, the value of the coalition is equal to 58+16+12=86. Thus, the
CFF scenario results in a simple characteristic function described in Table 1
(singletons have zero value in this case).
coalition {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
value 10 16 0 86
Table 1: The characteristic function of the network depicted in Fig. 2 if no
TPA is allowed.
If we use the PFF approach, then using similar considerations as above,
we get the partition function described in Table 2.
P v(C) P v(C)
{A,B,C} 86 {A,B} + {C} 10 , 0
{A,C} + {B} 16 , 0 {A} + {B,C} 0 , 0
{A} + {B} + {C} 0 , 0 , 0
Table 2: The partition function of the network depicted in Fig. 2 if no TPA
is allowed. P denotes the actual partition, while v(C) is the vector of values
of coalitions embedded in the particular partition.
When using the recursive-core-based approach, we obtain a the minimal
claim function which is identical to the characteristic function described in
Table 1. This illustrates that without TPA, the CFF and PFF approaches
coincide since transport profit is only produced inside of coalitions in this
case. The Shapley values derived in this case are [33, 25, 28] for players A,
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B, and C, respectively, which also coincide with the extended Shapley value
for the partition function.
3.1.2 TPA of lines 2 and 3
The CFF approach results in the characteristic function described in Table
3 and implies the Shapley values [41, 33, 12]. As we can see, the TPA of
lines 2 and 3 significantly decreased the bargaining power of player C, which
is not surprising.
coalition {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
value 58 16 0 86
Table 3: The characteristic function of the network depicted in Fig. 2 if TPA
of lines 2 and 3 is assumed.
The partition function, on the other hand, is summarized in Table 4. If
we derive the extended Shapley value (McQuillin (2009)) for the partition
function, we get [39, 31, 16].
P v(C) P v(C)
{A,B,C} 86 {A,B} + {C} 58 , 12
{A,C} + {B} 16 , 0 {A} + {B,C} 0 , 0
{A} + {B} + {C} 0 , 0 , 0
Table 4: The partition function of the network depicted in Fig. 2 if TPA of
lines 2 and 3 is assumed.
Regarding the recursive-core-based minimal claim function approach, the
minimal claim function derived from the partition function is described in
Table 5. The most important point is that in this case, the value of the sin-
gleton coalition C is nonzero (because of the transport profit corresponding
to the transport between A and B).
coalition {A} {B} {C} {A,B } {A,C } {B,C } {A,B,C }
MC value 0 0 12 58 16 0 86
Table 5: The minimal claim function of the network depicted in Fig. 2 if
TPA of lines 2 and 3 is assumed.
If we derive the (conventional) Shapley value from the minimal claim
function, then we get [39, 31, 16] in this case, which coincides with the
extended Shapley value. As we can see, the PFF approach, irrespective of
which Shapley value calculation we use, reflects how player 3 benefits from
the transport profit, as his Shapley value is increased by 33%.
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3.2 Example 2
In this example we study the path of the natural gas from Russia to Cen-
tral Europe. We define the following players to study this scenario: Poland
(Po), Austria (Au), Czech Republic and Slovakia (Cz-Sk), Ukraine (Ua), and
Russia (Ru). The 3rd player representing the Czech Republic and Slovakia
together holds two nodes, while the other players hold one node each. The
network is depicted in Fig 3. Numbers on the top of the nodes represent
the cost of production/alternative source, while the numbers on the bottom
show the amount of gas produced/demanded. Further numerical parameters
may be found in Appendix D.
Figure 3: Network of example 2.
The pipeline between Russia and Poland crosses the territory of Be-
larus. However, this segment of the Yamal-Europe pipeline is owned by
GAZPROM. To keep the example simple we do not take Belarus into ac-
count as a separate player. The countries in the example consume mainly
(although not exclusively) Russian gas, thus, we omitted other suppliers as
strategic players. We assume that if Russian gas is not available, then the
countries use alternative sources, such as LNG, which cost somewhat more.
The parameters of the network, such as nodal demand, pipeline capacities,
etc. were compiled from (Sziklai et al., 2018). The production cost and trans-
port fees in the example were determined based on Weiner (2016) as follows:
• Russian gas production cost was determined by taking the German im-
port price and subtracting the transportation cost via the Nord Stream
pipeline.
• To determine the transport fees of Ukraine we took the gas import
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price of Hungary and subtracted the Russian gas production price and
related transport costs.
• The base price of the alternative source was set as 20% more expensive
than the Russian gas. This was further adjusted with the network
position, that is, the price is increasing from West to East and from
North to South.
In addition to the above, we made the following assumptions:
• All lines in the network are taken into account as TPA.
• We assume that alternative sources may always be transported to the
node in question directly.
• We assume transport margin only on the Ukraine-Slovakia pipeline.
Po Au Cz-Sk Ua Ru
Shapley values based on CFF 400.4 182.7 247.9 663.0 1263.7
Shapley values based on PFF 400.4 134.3 179.0 894.7 1149.2
Table 6: Shapley values of example 2 in the case of the traditional charac-
teristic function form approach (CFF) and the proposed partition function
form approach (PFF)
Table 6 displays the Shapley values derived from the CFF and PFF ap-
proaches. We can see that applying the PFF approach and explicitly consid-
ering the transport profits results in a different characterization of bargaining
power. In particular, the Shapley value of Ukraine is nearly 35% greater in
the PFF game than in the CFF game and Ukraine’s position relative to
Russia is significantly improved.
We have discussed before that the sequence of the iterative process may
affect the results in the case of the PFF approach. As only one real source
(Russia) is present in the network, scenarios like in Appendix B do not arise
in this case, and thus, the result is independent of the sequence of the iterative
algorithm.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we define a framework for the cooperative game-theoretic mod-
eling of gas networks and markets, able to explicitly consider externalities
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that may arise due to regulated TPA. These externalities have been largely
ignored in the previous cooperative literature on gas networks. Regulated
TPA creates two challenges for the traditional approach: First, it may lead
to incompatible claims on scarce pipeline capacity and second, it may result
in transfer payments for transport services across coalitions.
We propose a solution for the second challenge by determining the flows
of a coalition in an iterative way that tracks transport fees in a two-party,
contract-driven manner regarding the source and the destination of gas. This
feature is essential for the calculation of transport fees and resulting transport
profits since members of a coalition may imply counter-directed flows on a
TPA pipeline generating transport profit for an external player. In addition,
this methodology allows us to calculate the individual costs and profits of
players in a given coalition, which is valuable additional information not
prevalent in existing cooperative game theoretic models. Using this iterative
flow mechanism, we are able to compute the partition function. In this
paper we propose to solve the resulting PFF game in two steps: first, by
using the minimal claim function to obtain a CFF-game and then, solving
this game with the traditional Shapley Value. Two examples illustrate the
methodology and demonstrate that accounting for TPA-related externalities
may substantially alter the power structure.
On the other hand, as demonstrated in the case of the example described
in Appendix B, the evaluation order of the coalitions may be important if
TPA leads to conflicting claims on transport capacities. For these cases, it
would be nice to have a more explicit mechanism for the allocation of pipeline
capacities. This issue, however, is left for further research.
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Appendix A
Parameters of Example 1 depicted in Fig. 2:
A =

 −1 0 −11 −1 0
0 1 1

Λ =

 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

 q¯ =

 1010
12

 (17)
T =

 4 0 0.74 0.5 0
0 0.5 0.3

 (18)
F =

 4 0 0.74 0.5 0
0 1 1

 (19)
d =

 010
2

S =

 1 0 00 10 0
0 0 10

 L¯ =

 1510
2

 (20)
Appendix B
To demonstrate how the partition in which the coalition is embedded plays
a role in the determination of its cost, let us consider the example depicted
in Fig. 4. This is a simple example of the TPA-induced resource allocation
discussed in section 1.
Figure 4: Network 2. The horizontal pipelines are TPA; E and F are dummy
nodes with no consumption and sources.
Let us consider the coalition {A,B}, first embedded in the partition
{A,B}, {C}, {D}, {E}, {F}. In this case, B is able to get gas from A, so its
cost is 4. Embedded in the partition {A,B}, {C,D}, {E}, {F}, the coalition
24
with the largest total demand is {C,D}, so first the flows belonging to them
are evaluated. The transport between C and D will use up all the trans-
port capacity of the TPA pipeline between E and F, so B must use its own
expensive source, so its cost will be 40.
This example also highlights how the exact sequence of the iterated al-
gorithm described in subsection 2.4 may influence the values of a partition.
If the flows of the coalition with the highest demand ({C,D}) are evaluated
first, then the result is a flow of 6 units from C to D. As the reference costs
(assuming all singletons) for the coalitions {A,B} and {C,D} are 40 and 60,
respectively, if we assume no transport costs and fees, then the total savings
for coalitions {A,B} and {C,D} (and, thus, the values of the coalitions) are
0 and 54, respectively.
On the other hand, if the flows of coalition {A,B} are evaluated first,
then the resulting flows are as follows: We have a flow of 4 units from A to
B and a flow of 2 units from C to D in this case, which results in savings of
36 and 18 for {A,B} and {C,D}, respectively.
Appendix C
In this appendix we provide a simple example describing the calculation of
the minimal claim function (in the spirit of the pessimistic recursive core).
Let us consider the partition function described in Table 7.
Partition Values
{A},{B},{C} 0,3,0
{A,B},{C} 2,1
{A,C},{B} 2,2
{A},{B,C} 1,2
{A,B,C} 4
Table 7: An example partition function
When determining e.g. the minimal claim of the singleton coalition {A},
we have to consider the partitions in which this coalition is embedded. This
means two cases: {{A}, {B}, {C}} and {{A}, {B,C}}. We have to consider
the residual game, namely the game of players B and C. The residual play-
ers form a stable partition in the residual game if they form the partition
{B}, {C}. The cooperation {B,C} is not stable in the residual game since
the payoff of the coalition {B,C} is only 2 in this case, and thus, player B
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is blocking it with a payoff of 3 in the case of {B}, {C}, resulting in the par-
tition of {{A}, {B}, {C}}. According this we assign the value 0 to coalition
{A} as minimal claim, as this is its payoff in the partition when the players of
the residual game form a stable partition. The pessimistic approach means
that in the case when more stable partitions are present in the residual game,
thus, more values are assigned to the coalition in question with the above
approach, we choose the lowest of them.
Appendix D
Parameters of Example 2 depicted in Fig. 3:
A =


0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 1
1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 −1
−1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0


(21)
Λ =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


q¯ =


145
40.1
5
0.93
0
54.93
49
97.7


(22)
T =


0 5.1225 5.85 4.65 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 2.175 0 0.6 0
0 0 0 4.65 2.175 4.95 0.6 8.775
1.5 0 5.85 0 0 0 0 8.775
1.5 5.1225 0 0 0 0 0 0

 (23)
F =


0 5.1225 5.85 4.65 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 2.175 0 0.6 0
0 0 0 4.65 2.175 4.95 0.6 8.775
1.5 0 5.85 0 0 0 0 44
1.5 5.1225 0 0 0 0 0 0

 (24)
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d =


13.4
8.7
7.8
4.4
11.2
0


S =


420 0 0 0 0 0
0 425 0 0 0 0
0 0 425 0 0 0
0 0 0 425 0 0
0 0 0 0 430 0
0 0 0 0 0 350


L¯ =


13.4
8.7
7.8
4.4
11.2
171.5


(25)
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